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Case No. 20080949-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
Bryan Waterfield, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for distribution or arranging to distribute 
a controlled substance (methamphetamine) and possession of a controlled substance 
(heroin). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 
2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether an order restarting probation constitutes a "sentence" and, if so, 
whether the omission of a term implicit in that order resulted in an illegal sentence? 
Standard of Review. A district court's rule 22(e) decision is a legal question that 
the appellate court reviews for correctness. State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, ^ 9, 
84 P.3d 854 (citing State v. Telford, 2002 UT 51, Iff 3-4,48 P.3d 228). 
2. Whether the trial court correctly resolved the claimed inaccuracies in the 
presentence report? 
Standard of Review. " Whether the trial court properly complied with a legal 
duty to resolve on the record the accuracy of contested information in sentencing 
reports is a question of law that [the appellate court] review[s] for correctness/' 
State v. Maroney, 2004 UT App 206, If 32,94 P.3d 295 (quoting State v. Veteto, 2000 UT 
62, If 13, 6 R3d 1133). 
STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statutes and rule are attached at Addendum A: 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-3-201 (West Supp. 2009); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-1 (West Supp. 2009); 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 22 and 30. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1 
On January 29, 2007, Defendant was charged in a second amended 
information with four counts of distribution of or arranging to distribute a 
controlled substance in a drug-free zone (Counts I, III, and IV—methamphetamine; 
Count II — crack cocaine), first degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-
37-8(l)(a)(ii) (West Supp. 2009), and one count of possession of a controlled 
A statement of the underlying facts of Defendant's convictions is 
unnecessary to the resolution of the issues raised on appeal and is, therefore, 
omitted. 
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substance (Count V—heroin), a third degree felony, in violation of (2)(a)(i) (West 
Supp. 2009).2 R46-48. 
On December 10,2007, Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of distribution 
of or arranging to distribute a controlled substance (methamphetamine) and one 
count of possession of a controlled substance (heroin) in a drug-free zone, second 
degree felonies. R164, 175 — 81; 471:2-3. Defendant agreed to be immediately 
sentenced, but also agreed that a postsentence report might be ordered "if the Court 
so desires." See Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Pleas ("plea 
agreement"), R180-86, at 184. Defendant further agreed that consecutive sentences 
would be imposed for the two second degree felonies, the prison time would be 
suspended and he would be placed on probation, and that "[t]he probation will be 
zero tolerance, meaning that I will be sent to prison without any second opportunity 
for probation in the event of violation of probation." Id. 
In accord with the plea agreement, the trial court proceeded to take 
Defendant's plea. R471:3-ll. During the plea colloquy, the court had with 
Defendant, the court stated that "the State is going to recommend probation and 
treatment, but with zero tolerance, . . . and I have approved that[.]" Id. at 5. 
2
 For the convenience of the Court and because subsequent amendments to 
statutory provisions at issue in this case do not affect its analysis, citation 
throughout this brief is to the current version of the code. 
3 
Defendant replied that he understood the zero-tolerance condition. Id. at 5-6. 
Thereafter, the court accepted Defendant's plea. Id. at 11. Defendant then waived 
his right to have a presentence report prepared and agreed to be sentenced 
immediately. Id. at 11. The trial court dismissed the remaining charges. Id. at 11. 
The court then sentenced Defendant to statutory, consecutive one-to-fifteen-year 
prison terms in the Utah State Prison. Rl64-65. The court suspended both prison 
terms, placed Defendant on zero-tolerance probation for 72 months, ordered him to 
serve twelve months in jail and, upon confirmation of available treatment at 
Serenity House, ordered that he be released to that facility to complete its intensive 
residential and outpatient drug treatment program. R165-67,168; 471:17. 
On April 9, 2008, Trent Wynn, Defendant's Adult Probation and Parole 
(AP&P) officer, filed an Affidavit in Support of Order to Show Cause, alleging that 
Defendant had violated the zero-tolerance conditions of his probation by using 
methamphetamine and by failing to complete a counseling or treatment program. 
R197-98. See also Progress/Violation Report, R194-96. 
On April 14, 2008, some four months after he pleaded guilty and was 
sentenced, Defendant admitted violating the conditions of his probation. R472:2-3. 
Based on Defendant's admitted probation violations and the parties' express 
agreement that probation was zero tolerance, the prosecutor argued that the court 
should execute Defendant's prison sentence. Id. at 7-8. Believing that Defendant yet 
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deserved another chance, the trial court revoked Defendant's probation, but 
reinstated it for another 72 months and reimposed all the original conditions of 
probation. R472:17. The court also ordered Defendant to serve twelve months in 
the Davis County Jail and that he be screened for entry into, and thereafter 
successfully complete, the Residential Substance Abuse Treatment (RSAT) program. 
See Minutes, Post Sentencing Judgment/Commitment, AP&P Order to Show Cause 
(//Judgment/Commitment,,), R210-11, attached at Addendum B; 472:17. The court 
repeated the original sentence — that Defendant was ordered to serve two 
consecutive one-to-fifteen-year terms of imprisonment and that it was suspending 
the jail sentence. See R472:17. The court, however, neglected to state either on the 
record or in its written order that in restarting Defendant's probation it was 
suspending the prison terms. R210-11; R472:17. 
On May 15, 2008, Kim Holden, the RSAT Team Supervisor, filed a 
progress/violation report concluding that Defendant was an unsuitable applicant 
for the RSAT Program. R230-32. The RSAT Program, the report stated, is a 5-month 
program providing low intensity residential treatment for ten hours per week. 
R231. According to the screening therapist, however, Defendant needed the highest 
level of intensive residential therapy for up to a year and a half. Id. Only this more 
intensive treatment, the therapist asserted, would be therapeutic for Defendant 
because, in addition to his admitted addiction issues, Defendant suffered from 
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significant personality disorders. Id. Without the cognitive therapy provided by the 
more intensive Conquest Program, available only in the prison, the therapist stated, 
Defendant's therapy would be overwhelmed by his distorted underlying belief 
systems, and he% would likely resume his failed lifestyle. R231-32. 
On May 19, 2008, based on AP&Fs report and the understanding that 
Defendant had not been accepted into the RSAT Program, the parties stipulated that 
Defendant should be immediately "resentenced." R237; 461:2. Defendant urged the 
court not to execute the sentence originally imposed because the Conquest program 
might not be available to him. R461:3-4. The State opposed Defendant's request, 
pointing out that the RSAT program was an "ASAM [American Society of 
Addiction Medicine] level three/' whereas Defendant "tested out at AS AM level 
nine." Id. at 4. Defendant disputed the prosecutor's facts, asserting that upon 
discharge from Serenity House, "his ASAMs was [sic] only 3.5." Id. at 5. In 
response, the prosecutor and Kim Holden, the RSAT supervisor, offered that the 
counselor at Serenity House would not have had all the information concerning 
Defendant's lengthy drug and criminal history that Ms. Holden and the RSAT 
therapist had available. Id. at 5-7. The trial court refused to suspend the original 
sentence or restart probation, and instead executed the sentence originally 
imposed — two consecutive one-to-fifteen-year terms in the Utah State Prison. R238, 
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243, 461:12. The court further recommended that Defendant be admitted to the 
"Drug Board and/or the Conquest Program." R238, 243; 461:12. 
On June 4,2008, Defendant, pro se, filed a timely notice of appeal, challenging 
the execution of his prison sentence on the ground that the information submitted to 
the court—that he was not qualified to participate in the RSAT program—was 
unfounded and invalid. R253. Although Defendant withdrew the notice of appeal, 
see R261, he nevertheless filed a pro se motion under rule 22(e), Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, to correct the allegedly illegal sentence imposed on May 19, 
denying him access to the RSAT program. R299-303. This motion was supported by 
separate allegations from counsel that "the State's [RSAT] evaluation was 
improperly inflated" and that it was unsupported by the testimony of the 
evaluators. See Memorandum in Support of Motion to Appoint Counsel, R279-81. 
On August 19, 2008, the prosecutor filed a memorandum in opposition to 
Defendant's rule 22(e) motion. R316-24. The prosecutor again reminded the court 
that it had accepted Defendant's guilty plea with Defendant's understanding that if 
he violated the zero-tolerance conditions of his probation the court would execute 
the originally imposed prison sentences. Id. at 317-18. Based on the court's 
acceptance of the plea, case law, and court rules, the prosecutor argued that the trial 
court was required to execute the prison sentences. Id. at 320-22. In any case, the 
prosecutor argued, the court's execution of the original sentence on May 19 did not 
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constitute an illegal sentence because the original sentence conformed to statutory 
requirements and the plea agreement and Defendant had been shown to be 
ineligible for the RSAT program. Id. at 322-23. 
On August 25, 2008, the court was prepared to hear argument and take 
evidence, if presented, on Defendant's rule 22(e) motion. R467:2. The court noted 
that the manner in which AP&P determined that Defendant was ineligible for the 
RSAT program might have violated Defendant's due process rights. Id. at 5. The 
matter was continued, however, because the State persuaded the court, and 
Defendant agreed, that before the court could hear Defendant's rule 22(e) motion it 
had to determine whether Defendant's violation of the zero-tolerance condition of 
probation deprived the court of jurisdiction to do anything other than to sentence 
Defendant to prison. 467:7-16. The court later rejected the State's position, holding 
that it did have jurisdiction to consider the matter. See Ruling on State's Motion to 
Strike Sentencing Hearing for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, R378-83. 
On September 8,2008, the trial court, sua sponte, determined under rule 22(e), 
that its order of April 14 —revoking and reinstating probation—was an "illegal 
sentence" because the court had failed to explicitly suspend the prison sentence. 
R468:2. Defendant did not object. Id. The court stated that it would suspend the 
April 14 "sentence," and sentence Defendant anew, based on his admitted probation 
violations. Id. The court noted that since Defendant was to be sentenced anew, 
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Defendant's claim that he had previously been improperly screened for the RSAT 
program, appeared to be moot. Id. at 2-3, 5. Nevertheless, the court repeatedly 
asserted throughout the hearing that because it still considered Defendant to be a 
potential candidate for the RSAT program it needed to examine AP&P's earlier 
screening to relieve its serious concerns about whether that process had been 
conducted appropriately. Id. at 3, 5-9. Later, the court ruled that its execution of 
sentence on May 19 was also invalid because Defendant and the court had 
proceeded without the preparation of a presentence or postsentence report. 
R378;381. 
On September 16,2008, the court reiterated that given its ruling that the April 
14, 2008 order revoking and restarting Defendant's probation was illegal, the 
question of Defendant's prior screening for the RSAT program was moot. Id. at 
R469:5. Defendant again did not object to this ruling. Id. The prosecutors and Ms. 
Holden (the RSAT Team Supervisor) provided the court with a detailed explanation 
of the procedures and findings used by AP&P in determining that Defendant was 
ineligible for the RSAT program. Id. at 2-42. The court found that explanation 
satisfactory and concluded that the court need not consider the RSAT program as an 
option in executing Defendant's original sentence. Id. at 9-20, 26-28, 33-41. 
Defendant again did not object. Id. at 41. 
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An updated progress violation report, filed October 3, 2008, noted that 
repeated prior treatment programs had failed to achieve their desired effects with 
Defendant. R372-74, at 374. Trent Wynn, Defendant's probation officer, who had 
shown forbearance by not reporting Defendant's first probation violation, see R194-
96, now recommended that Defendant be sentenced to prison. Id. Agent Wynn's 
revised recommendation—that Defendant was not amenable to probation—was 
based on Defendant's failure to take advantage of eleven (11) prior treatment 
programs and Defendant's violation in the current case, even though Defendant was 
aware that a violation would likely result in his being separated from his dying 
mother, whom he allegedly wished to care for. Id. 
On October 6, 2008, the court was prepared to execute again on Defendant's 
original sentence. R470. A presentence/postsentence report (PSI) set out 
Defendant's lengthy criminal record, which spanned more than twenty years and 
listed prior commitments at the Utah State Prison for several forgery convictions, 
possession of cocaine, theft by receiving, and drug distribution. PSI, R328:4-6. The 
criminal history also listed numerous dismissed charges. Id. Defendant alleged 
certain inaccuracies in his criminal, treatment, and life histories. R470:20,24-30. The 
trial court resolved some of the alleged inaccuracies, but simply accepted 
Defendant's contentions as to the other alleged inaccuracies. Id. at 25-30. Defendant 
did not challenge the report's statements that he had frequently relapsed while in 
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treatment programs, that he had frequently tested positive for illegal drugs while 
being supervised by AP&P, and that his continued use of drugs had resulted in 
multiple parole violations. R328:8. Nor did he challenge AP&P's recommendation 
that zero-tolerance conditions be imposed if Defendant were to be placed on parole. 
taatl. 
Several witnesses spoke on behalf of the State. Officer Wynn, Defendant's 
AP&P officer, asserted that he no longer believed that Defendant had been fully 
forthright concerning his probation violations. Id. at 32-35. He opined that 
Defendant knew how "to say the right things," but that Defendant had failed to take 
advantage of his treatment at Serenity House and that now, he believed, Defendant 
deserved a prison sentence. Id. at 35-36. Ms. Holden stated that no community 
programs were then available to meet Defendant's needs. Id. at 35. Lastly, Officer 
Miya stated that at the time of the events in this case, Defendant's name frequently 
came up in conversation within Metro Narcotics in connection with local drug 
distribution: The Wood Cross Police Chief asked Officer Miya to take care of 
complaints concerning Defendant's drug distribution activities, which sometimes 
occurred within 100 feet of the city park and the police station (id. at 37); a SWAT hit 
on Defendant's mother's home uncovered methamphetamine, heroin, cocaine, 
marijuana, and paraphernalia (id.); a search of Defendant's car on another occasion 
uncovered a safe containing drugs and a handgun (id. at 37-38); at least three 
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confidential informants provided incriminating information about Defendant's drug 
dealings and their participation in drug buys, which resulted in Defendant's arrest 
(id. at 38-39); and that since this last case, complaints in the Woods Cross 
neighborhood had decreased. Id. at 39. 
The court executed Defendant's prison sentence. R375; 470:48-52. Having 
reviewed the postsentence report and having heard from the various persons 
supporting the views of both parties, the court made the following observations: 
Defendant had received a very beneficial plea bargain and recommendation by the 
State that he be offered probation instead of prison (id. at 49); Defendant had been 
placed on clear notice that a probation violation would result in his being sent to 
prison (id.); Defendant had promised that he would not violate his probation (id.)} 
Defendant's supervising agent had similarly shown great forbearance in 
disregarding Defendant's first probation violation (id.)} upon his second violation, 
Defendant had been given yet another chance — the opportunity to be screened for 
the RSAT program. Id. at 50. The court stated that it now understood that 
Defendant was ineligible for RSAT. Id. Finally, the court noted, despite the State's 
and AP&P's leniency and the zero-tolerance condition, Defendant had continued to 
violate the terms of his probation. Id. Accordingly, the court ordered Defendant to 
serve the previously-imposed statutory, consecutive one-to-fifteen-year prison 
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terms in the Utah State Prison. R470:50; 375-77, 388-89. The court also 
recommended that Defendant be considered for the Conquest program. Id. 
Defendant, pro se, and later through new appellate counsel, filed multiple 
notices of appeal. R391-93,410,417-18. This Court assigned separate case numbers 
in connection with each notice of appeal and ultimately consolidated the cases 
under this case number. R411,414,436,438,441,456. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. 
Defendant claims that the trial court incorrectly ruled that it imposed an 
illegal sentence on April 14, 2008, when it revoked and restarted probation. This, 
Defendant claims, prejudicially precluded him from challenging AP&P's initial 
assessment of his ineligibility for the RSAT program and from having the court 
consider him anew for the same or a similar program. The State acknowledges that 
the trial court incorrectly ruled that it imposed an "illegal sentence" on April 14, but 
for a much more fundamental reason than cursorily argued by Defendant: There 
exists no issue of illegal sentence in this case. 
The trial court ruled that the hearing on April 14 resulted in an illegal 
sentence under rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, but the court was 
mistaken in its characterization of that hearing. Rather, the April 14 hearing was 
nothing more than a typical probation revocation hearing in which probation was 
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revoked, the execution of the previously imposed sentence was stayed, and 
probation was restarted to provide for intensive substance abuse treatment. The 
trial court did, indeed, neglect to expressly state on the record or in its written order 
that it was again suspending the previously-imposed prison sentences. But that was 
implicit in its revocation order: in restarting probation it necessarily continued to 
suspend Defendant's original prison sentence. That "error," "arising from oversight 
or omission," could easily have been corrected under rule 30, Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. The court, however, mistakenly seized on the inapplicable 
legal device of "illegal sentence." Apparently the court believed that only by 
nullifying the April 14 "sentence" could it legitimately evaluate whether AP&P had 
fairly screened Defendant for the RSAT program and then, going forward, consider 
whether Defendant could be fairly screened as a genuine candidate for the program. 
Notwithstanding its mischaracterization of the April 14 proceeding as a 
sentencing, the court never illegally sentenced Defendant. Rather, it correctly 
sentenced Defendant at the outset—on December 10, 2007 —when it originally 
imposed and suspended Defendant's prison terms. The trial court then correctly 
revoked probation following Defendant's admitted violations and restarted 
probation. Finally, it correctly executed on Defendant's original sentence when the 
information presented to the Court showed that he was ineligible for the RSAT 
program. 
14 
The Court should decline to consider Defendant's claim of prejudice because 
he has failed to cite any portion of the lengthy record on this point. In any case, the 
claim is meritless. Defendant argues that as a result of the court's erroneous ruling 
he was precluded from challenging AP&P's RS AT program assessment of him and 
from having the court later consider him for that or a similar program. Contrary to 
that argument, the court clearly indicated that it was deeply concerned that AP&P 
had not fairly screened Defendant for the RS AT program and may even have denied 
Defendant his due process rights in his challenging the screening. Thereafter, the 
court held a lengthy hearing in which it challenged the prosecution to show that the 
court's concerns were unfounded. That allayed the court's concerns. That hearing 
provided information about the unbiased nature of the screening process generally. 
It showed that Defendant was basically ineligible for the program because of his 
lengthy criminal and drug distribution history. And it demonstrated that AP&P 
had expanded its screening procedure by providing, at the court's request, an 
additional psychological interview even though Defendant was basically ineligible 
for the RSAT program. 
II. 
The State concedes that the trial court failed to resolve on the record two 
claimed inaccuracies in the presentence report. Accordingly, the case should be 
remanded to the trial court for resolution of those matters. However, the Court 
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should decline to consider Defendant's other claimed inaccuracies, argued under 
the rubric of ineffective assistance of counsel, because the claim is inadequately 
briefed. Defendant has not even identified the inaccuracies which he claims the 
court failed to resolve or provided any reasoned argument about how those claimed 
inaccuracies affected his sentence. 
ARGUMENT 
L 
AN ORDER RESTARTING PROBATION DOES NOT 
CONSTITUTE A "SENTENCE" SUBJECT TO REVIEW UNDER 
RULE 22(E); IN ANY EVENT, ANY ERROR WAS HARMLESS 
Defendant claims that in declaring the "sentence" imposed on April 14,2008, 
illegal the trial court incorrectly relied on a "'run-of-the-mill error/ if any, that is not 
reviewable under rule 22(e)." Aplt. Br. at 16. That erroneous ruling, he argues, 
"precluded [him] from challenging the dubious RSAT program assessment" and 
from "having the court legitimately consider him for a residential drug treatment 
program such as the RSAT program." Aplt. Br. at 16-17. 
The State acknowledges that the trial court incorrectly ruled that it imposed 
an "illegal sentence" on April 14. But any error was harmless in the circumstances 
of this case. In direct contravention of Defendant's argument, the trial court 
requested, contemporaneously with its ruling on the "illegal sentence," substantive 
clarification from both the State and Defendant as to whether Defendant had been 
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validly screened for the RSAT program. The court sought and then heard relevant 
information so that it would be assured that—preliminary to its executing the 
original sentence or ordering probation— the processes used to determine eligibility 
for the RSAT program would be fully and fairly applied to Defendant if that 
program was available to him. 
While the trial court's error was harmless in the circumstances of this case, the 
error should nevertheless be sorted out to clarify that the challenged ruling in this 
case never involved a "sentence" in the first instance, thus negating the existence of 
an "illegal sentence." Beyond that, the trial court's error—failure to explicitly 
suspend the original sentence and in restarting probation on April 14 — was clerical 
and therefore did not affect the legality of the original sentence. And while the 
court's probation revocation order of May 19 is not attacked on appeal, it is similarly 
important to clarify that the court did not impose an illegal sentence at that time. 
Rather, the court simply executed Defendant's original sentence upon his admitted 
probation violations and his ineligibility for the RSAT program. 
A. The April 14 and May 19 rulings did not entail "sentencing" 
proceedings amenable to review under rule 22(e). 
1. Procedural review. 
On December 10,2007, Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of distribution 
of or arranging to distribute a controlled substance (methamphetamine) and one 
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count of possession of a controlled substance (heroin) in a drug-free zone, second 
degree felonies. R164,175-81. In accord with the plea agreement, the court and the 
parties agreed that Defendant would be placed on zero-tolerance probation. R471:5-
6. The trial court accepted Defendant's plea and, after Defendant waived his right 
to have a presentence report prepared, sentenced him to consecutive one-to-fifteen-
year terms in the Utah State Prison. R164-65; 471:11. The court suspended both 
prison terms, placed Defendant on zero-tolerance probation for 72 months, and 
ordered that, upon space becoming available, Defendant complete the intensive 
residential and outpatient drug treatment program at Serenity House. R165-67,168; 
471:17. 
On April 14, 2008, some four months after he pleaded guilty and was 
sentenced, Defendant admitted violating the conditions of his probation. See 
Minutes, Post Sentencing Judgment/Commitment, AP&P Order to Show Cause 
("Judgment/Commitment"), R210-11, attached at Addendum B; 472:2-3. Over the 
prosecution's objection that Defendant had violated the zero-tolerance condition of 
his probation, the trial court revoked Defendant's probation, but reinstated it for 
another 72 months and reimposed all the original conditions of probation. R472:17. 
The court also ordered Defendant to serve twelve months in the Davis County Jail 
and that he be screened for entry into, and thereafter successfully complete, the 
RSAT program. R211; 472:17. The court stated that Defendant was sentenced to 
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two consecutive one-to-fifteen-year terms of imprisonment and that it was 
suspending the jail sentence, see R472:17; however, it neglected to mention at the 
hearing and in its written judgment that it was suspending the prison terms. R210-
11; 472:17. 
On May 19, 2008, based on AP&P's report and testimony of AP&P agent 
Holden's testimony documenting a clinical evaluation and criminal history that 
rendered Defendant ineligible for the RSAT program, the parties stipulated that 
Defendant should be immediately "resentenced." R230-32,237; 461:2. After hearing 
argument from both Defendant and the prosecutor, the trial court refused to 
suspend the original sentence or restart probation, and instead executed the two 
consecutive one-to-fifteen-year terms in the Utah State Prison originally imposed. 
R238, 243, 461:12. 
On September 8,2008, the trial court, sua sponte, determined that under rule 
22(e) the "sentence" it imposed on April 14 was an illegal sentence. R468:2. The 
trial court reasoned that in placing Defendant on probation and directing that he be 
screened for the RSAT program, the court had neglected to suspend the prison 
sentence and then failed to sentence Defendant to jail before ordering the RSAT 
screening. R468:2. Accordingly, the court "corrected" the "illegal sentence" 
imposed on April 14 by suspending it, and asserting that the circumstances were 
now as they were on April 14, 2008. Id. at 2, 5. The court then announced that it 
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would "resentence" Defendant based on his admitted probation violations. Id. at 4-
5. Later, the court ruled that its execution of sentence on May 19 was also invalid 
because Defendant and the court had proceeded without the preparation of a 
presentence or postsentence report. R378:381. 
On October 6, 2008, the court "resentenced" Defendant to consecutive 
statutory one-to-fifteen-year terms in the Utah State Prison. R470:50; 375-77,388-89. 
2. The April 14 proceeding entailed a revocation and restarting 
of probation, not a sentencing; accordingly, the court's 
determination that its order resulted in an illegal sentence 
under rule 22(e), albeit harmless, is inapposite to the 
proceedings. 
Rule 22(e) provides that "[t]he court may correct an illegal sentence, or a 
sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time." Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e). 
However, when a trial court orders a defendant's probation revoked and then 
restarts probation the order does not constitute a "sentence." Therefore, any error in 
revoking and restarting probation is not an illegal sentence correctable under rule 
22(e). 
Here, the trial court mischaracterized its April 14 order revoking and 
restarting Defendant's probation, as a "sentence." As discussed below, see I.B.2., 
Defendant was not prejudiced by the trial court's mistake. Nevertheless, the error 
should be sorted out to ensure that the court ultimately executed Defendant's 
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sentence according to statute and to clarify that the specialized reach of rule 22(e) 
does not extend to the type of error committed by the court in this case. 
The ordering of probation at the time of sentencing is indeed a "sentence." 
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-201 (2)(c)-(d) (West Supp. 2009) ("[A] court may 
sentence a person convicted of an offense to any one of the following sentences or 
combination of them:. . . to probation . . . ; to imprisonment^]") Utah's statutory 
scheme, however, does not regard the revocation and restarting of probation as a 
sentence. Rather, orders relating to those dispositions are essentially post-sentence 
dispositions: "On a plea of guilty... or conviction of any crime or offense, the court 
may, after imposing sentence, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the 
defendant on probation." UTAH CODE ANN. §77-18-1 (2)(a) (West Supp. 2009) 
(emphasis added). Cf State v. Walker, 2002 UT App 290, If 12, 55 P.3d 1165 
(recognizing that order changing supervised probation to bench probation did not 
constitute another sentence); State v. Peterson, 869 P.2d 989, 992 (Utah App. 1994) 
(distinguishing illegally reinstated "sentence" for less than statutorily-mandated 
term of imprisonment from legally reinstated and modified "probation"). 
And statute expressly distinguishes between a "sentence" and the various 
"orders" that may follow if, as in this case, the conditions of probation are violated: 
"Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of probation, the court 
may order the probation revoked, modified, continued, or that the entire probation 
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term commence anew/7 UTAH CODE ANN. §77-18-1(12) (e)(ii) (WestSupp. 2009). In 
other words, none of the stated actions a court may take constitutes the imposition 
of a sentence. Moreover, if, as in this case, a defendant has earlier been sentenced 
and the court has revoked the defendant's probation, the court's only alternative is 
to execute the original sentence. See UTAH CODE ANN. §77-18-1 (12)(e)(iii) (West 
Supp. 2009) ("If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the 
sentence previously imposed shall be executed.")3 
In sum, the trial court mischaracterized its revoking and restarting 
Defendant's probation on April 14 as a "sentence." Accordingly, any oversight in 
the court's not stating that Defendant's -prison sentences were to continue to be 
suspended does not create an illegal sentence correctable under rule 22(e). 
3
 The alternative in section 77-18-1 (12)(e)(iii) to providing that "[i]f probation 
is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced," evidently applies to cases in which a 
defendant has not yet been sentenced, i.e., violation of a condition of probation 
following a plea in abeyance. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-2a-l(l) (West 2009) ("'Plea 
in abeyance' means an order by a court, upon motion of the prosecution and the 
defendant, accepting a plea of guilty or of no contest from the defendant but not, at 
that time, entering judgment of conviction against him nor imposing sentence upon him on 
condition that he comply with specific conditions as set forth in a plea in abeyance 
agreement.") (emphasis added). See also State v. Hunsaker, 933 P.2d 415,416 (Utah 
App. 1997) (holding a plea in abeyance is not a final order in part because the 
defendant had not been sentenced). 
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3. The "illegality"of the April 14 probation revocation was no 
more than a clerical oversight 
In any event, the court's oversight in not repeating that it was suspending 
Defendant's prison terms was, at most, an oversight—not an illegality invalidating 
the court's lawful order revoking and restarting probation. "Clerical mistakes in 
judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors in the record arising from 
oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time " Utah R. Crim. P. 
30(b). 'The purpose of rule 30(b)... is to correct clerical errors so that the record 
reflects what was actually 'done or intended.'" State v. Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, f^ 14, 
218 P.3d 610 (citation omitted). "A clerical error is one made in recording a 
judgment that results in the entry of a judgment which does not conform to the 
actual intention of the court." Id. (citation omitted). "'To ascertain the clerical 
nature of the mistake, this Court will look to the record to harmonize the intent of 
the court with the written judgment.'" Id. (quoting State v. Lorrah, 761 P.2d 1388, 
1389 (Utah 1988). Cf. State v. Parry, 837 P.2d 998,999 (Utah App. 1992) (upholding 
sentence which, in contradistinction to oral ruling, correctly conformed to statutory 
requirements). "'[I]n this broad approach to correctability . . ., it matters little 
whether an error was made by the court clerk . . . or the judge himself [.]'" Id. 
(quoting Bishop v. GenTec, Inc., 2002 UT 36, | 30,48 P.3d 218) (additional citations 
omitted). 
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Here, the record and simple logic show that the trial court unintentionally 
neglected to state in its April 14 order that in restarting Defendant's probation the 
original sentences were to be continued to be suspended. See R210-11, at 211 
(Addendum B). The record shows that in revoking and restarting Defendant's 
probation, the trial court reimposed all the original conditions of probation. 
R472:17. The court also noted that Defendant had already been sentenced to two 
consecutive one-to-fifteen-year terms of imprisonment and that it was suspending 
the jail sentence. R472:17. The court also ordered Defendant to serve twelve months 
in the Davis County Jail and that he be screened for entry into, and thereafter 
successfully complete, the RSAT program when space became available. R211; 
472:17. Patently, the court would have been aware that in restarting Defendant's 
probation it would have to continue to suspend the prison sentences. See UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 77-18-1 (2)(a) (West Supp. 2009) (providing that in ordering probation 
the court suspends the sentence). Cf. Walker, 2002 UT App 290, f^ 12 ("suspending 
or staying a sentence presumes a necessary pre-condition that the sentence actually 
be imposed"). In short, the court's oversight was easily correctable without resort to 
declaring an illegal sentence under rule 22(e). 
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4. The May 19 proceeding, which entailed an execution of the 
original sentence, also did not entail a sentencing. 
While Defendant does not claim any error stemming from the May 19 
hearing, the convoluted proceedings in this case should be fully unraveled to ensure 
that the court properly executed his sentence. As with the April 14 proceeding, the 
court also mischaracterized the May 19 proceeding as a "sentence." R378:381. It also 
ruled that "sentence" to be illegal because it had sentenced Defendant to prison 
without a presentence or postsentence report. R378:381. Although the court was 
mistaken on both counts, any error was harmless. See Aple. Br. at I.B.2-3. 
First, the May 19 proceeding also did not entail a sentence. Rather, upon 
Defendant's admitted probation violations and demonstrated ineligibility for the 
RSAT program, the court again revoked Defendant's probation and ordered 
Defendant to prison under the terms of the original sentences. R R230-32, 237-38, 
243; 461:2,12. That procedure is not a "resentencing," as the parties and the court 
mischaracterized it, but rather the execution of the original sentence. See UTAH CODE 
ANN. §77-18-1 (12)(e)(iii) (West Supp. 2009). Accordingly, even if there were an 
irregularity in the proceedings, resort to rule 22(e) was not the way to remedy it. 
Second, there was no irregularity in the execution of the sentence. Contrary to 
the court's stated rationale, a presentence report is not a prerequisite to sentencing a 
defendant. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(5)(a) (West Supp. 2009) ('Trior to the 
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imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the concurrence of the defendant, 
continue the date for the imposition of sentence for a reasonable period of time for 
the purpose of obtaining a presentence investigation . . . .") (emphasis added). See 
also State v. Gentlewind, 844 P.2d 372,375 (Utah Ct. 1992) (recognizing that a court is 
not compelled to consider additional psychological information, even if relevant 
and helpful, if the court otherwise has sufficient information to impose sentence). 
Cf. State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, | 11, 84 P.2d 854 (stating that "while a 
psychosexual evaluation may be useful in sentencing, it is not mandatory"). In any 
case, Defendant expressly waived the preparation of a presentence report when he 
was originally sentenced and at no time thereafter did he request one. R471:ll. In 
short, the court's stated reason for declaring the May 19 "sentence" to be illegal is 
insufficient in law. 
Finally, execution of Defendant's sentence on May 19 was the only 
appropriate alternative when the trial court learned that a prerequisite of 
Defendant's probation—his eligibility for the RSAT program—could not be fulfilled 
at the outset. See e.g., People v. Esparza, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 377, 381-83 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2003) (upholding execution of prison sentence upon finding that the defendant was 
statutorily precluded from treatment). 
In sum, the execution of Defendant's sentence did not entail an illegal 
sentence correctable under rule 22(e). Moreover, it was legally correct. And any 
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conceivable error was remedied when the court, having considered the 
presentence/postsentence report, again executed Defendant's sentence and finally 
ordered him to prison on October 6, 2008. R470:50; 375-77, 388-89. See State v. 
Yazzie, 2009 UT 14, | 16, 203 P.3d 984 (recognizing that trial judge's later 
determination to specify that sentences were to run consecutively, in accord with 
statutory requirement, "corrected the illegally imposed [first] sentence"). 
C. Postscript to trial court's procedural conundrums. 
The record is silent as to why the trial court felt compelled to declare that the 
easily corrected omission in its April 14 order resulted in an illegal sentence. But the 
prosecutor's argument, first raised on April 14 and pressed throughout the rest of 
the proceedings, suggests an answer. The prosecutor argued that based on 
Defendant's admitted probation violations and the parties' zero-tolerance plea 
agreement the court was legally required to execute Defendant's prison sentences. 
The court would have lost jurisdiction of the case if the prosecution was correct. See 
Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, f 13 ("Once a court imposes a valid sentence and final 
judgment is entered, the court ordinarily loses subject matter jurisdiction over the 
case.") (citing State v. Montoya, 825 P.2d 676,679 (Utah App. 1991)). Accordingly, it 
would appear that the court mistakenly seized on the device of "illegal sentence" as 
a way of ensuring that its well-intentioned wish to give Defendant another chance 
for treatment would not be frustrated. See Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, f 10 ("If an 
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illegal sentence has been imposed, 'the court does not lose jurisdiction over the 
sentence until that sentence has been corrected/"). 
The same concern—the loss of jurisdiction following the court's executing 
Defendant's sentence — more clearly explains why the court also mistakenly held the 
May 19 hearing to result in an illegal sentence. The court executed Defendant's 
original sentence and ordered him to prison based on his admitted probation 
violations and AP&P's assessment that Defendant was ineligible for the RSAT 
program. Not long afterward, however, the court repeatedly expressed concern that 
AP&P had not fairly screened Defendant for the program. Thus, only by nullifying 
the "sentences" imposed on both April 14 and May 19 could it legitimately continue 
to evaluate whether AP&P had fairly screened Defendant for the RSAT program 
and then, going forward, consider whether Defendant could be fairly screened as a 
genuine candidate for the program. 
Notwithstanding its mischaracterization of the April 14 and May 19 
proceedings as "sentencings," the court never illegally sentenced Defendant. 
Rather, it correctly sentenced Defendant at the outset, it correctly revoked probation 
following Defendant's admitted violations and then restarted probation, and it 
correctly executed Defendant's original sentence when the information presented to 
the Court showed that he was ineligible for the RSAT program. And, as shown 
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below, the court correctly determined that the sentence it imposed on April 14 was 
illegal, Defendant suffered no prejudice. 
B. Defendant has failed to show that he was prejudiced by the 
court's determination that the April 14 sentence was illegal. 
Defendant argues that he was prejudiced because the trial court's erroneous 
ruling on the illegality of the April 14, 2008 sentence "precluded [him] from 
challenging the dubious RSAT Program assessment." Aplt. Br. at 16. "This," he in 
turn argues, "precluded [him] from having the court legitimately consider him for a 
residential drug treatment program such as the RSAT Program." Aplt. Br. at 16-17. 
Defendant has not adequately briefed this claim. He omits from his brief the 
extensive record evidence in support of the trial court's finding and the trial court's 
lengthy review, which demonstates that further review to determine Defendant's 
eligibility for the RSAT program was unnecessary. 
1. Procedural review. 
As stated, at the April 14, 2008 order-to-show-cause hearing, the court 
ordered, as a condition of continued probation, that Defendant be screened for entry 
into, and thereafter successfully complete the RSAT program. R211; 472:17. 
AP&P subsequently determined that Defendant was ineligible for the RSAT 
program, a low intensity residential treatment program, based on his significant 
behavioral and personality problems. R230-32. 
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On May 19, 2008, based on AP&P's report and the understanding that 
Defendant had not been accepted into the RSAT Program, the parties stipulated that 
Defendant should be immediately "resentenced/' R237; 461:2. Defendant urged the 
court not to execute the sentence originally imposed because the prison Conquest 
program might not be available to him. R461:3-4. The State opposed Defendant's 
request to not execute the prison sentence, pointing out that the RSAT program was 
an "ASAM [American Society of Addiction Medicine] level three," whereas 
Defendant "tested out at ASAM level nine." Id. at 4. Defendant disputed the 
prosecutor's facts, asserting that upon discharge from Serenity House "his ASAMs 
was [sic] only 3.5." Id. at 5. In response, the prosecutor and Kim Holden offered 
that the counselor at Serenity House would not have had all the information 
concerning Defendant's lengthy drug and criminal history that Ms. Holden and the 
RSAT therapist had available. Id. at 5-7. The trial court refused to suspend the 
original sentence or restart probation, and instead executed the sentence originally 
imposed — two consecutive one-to-fifteen-year terms in the Utah State Prison. R238, 
243, 461:12. The court further recommended that Defendant be admitted to the 
"Drug Board and/or the Conquest Program." R238, 243; 461:12. 
Defendant thereafter challenged the trial court's ruling that accepted the 
State's determination that he was ineligible to participate in the RSAT program, 
30 
arguing that it was based on unfounded and invalid information. R253,279-81,299-
303. 
On August 25,2008, the court noted, in light of the discrepancies alleged by 
the parties, that the manner in which AP&P determined that Defendant was 
ineligible for the RSAT program might have violated Defendant's due process 
rights. Id. at 5-6. 
At the September 8,2008 hearing, after concluding that the sentence imposed 
on April 14 was illegal, the court expressed its concern that Defendant had not been 
genuinely and fairly screened for the RSAT program. R468: 2-10. The court noted 
that since Defendant was to be sentenced anew, Defendant's claim, that he had 
previously been improperly screened for the RSAT program, appeared to be moot. 
Id. at 2-3, 5. Nevertheless, the court still considered Defendant to be a potential 
candidate for the RSAT program. Id. at 3. 
Thereafter, the court repeatedly stated that before it "resentenced" Defendant 
it needed to clarify whether Defendant had earlier been invalidly screened for the 
RSAT program and, based on that review, whether, going forward, Defendant could 
be fairly screened for the program. Id. at 3,5, 8-9. The court noted that there were 
"some issues . . . that [were] really troubling [] to the court." Id. at 5-6. The court 
was specifically concerned about "what took place between counsel and Adult 
Probation and Parole," and the parties7 contradictory representations to the court as 
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to whether a screening involving an AS AM evaluation had ever taken place. Id. at 3, 
8-9. Resolution of those issues, the court stated, was necessary because it would 
"affect further sentencing in this case/7 Id. at 7. 
In response, defense counsel asked for a continuance of the next scheduling 
hearing to allow him to subpoena witnesses. Id. at 6. Later, counsel asked simply 
that the discussion of screening issues be heard at the resentencing. Id. at 8. The 
court agreed, but specifically suggested that information concerning the screening 
be provided to the court before the resentencing. Id. at 9. 
On September 16, 2008, the court continued to consider the question of 
AP&P's screening procedures for the RSAT program. R469. The court reiterated 
that given its ruling that the April 14, 2008 sentence was illegal, the question of 
Defendant's prior screening for the RSAT program was moot. Id. at 5. However, 
because sentencing Defendant to be screened for the RSAT program was still an 
option to be considered, the court needed to know that Defendant would receive "a 
fair review." Id. at 5-6. Specifically referring to the manner in which Defendant 
alleged he had previously been screened for the RSAT program, the court reiterated 
its concerns about the alleged discrepancies in Defendant's AS AM screening scores, 
AP&P's apparent denial that any test scores even existed, and the absence of 
measurable criteria in assessing eligibility for the program. The trial court thought 
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this suggested that Defendant's due process rights might have been violated. Id. at 
6-7,11,15-16,22. 
In response, Ms. Holden explained that Davis Behavioral Health had 
determined at the outset that Defendant was "automatically disqualified because of 
the distribution charges" on Defendant's record. Id. at 8. See PSL4-6. The trial 
court stated that in its experience, convicts with distribution charges were still 
eligible for the RSAT program. Id. at 13-15, 32-33. Ms. Holden explained that the 
choice of treatment programs is first based on whether the system is dealing with an 
addict who commits crimes to serve his addiction or a criminal who has a drug 
problem and that the RSAT program is directed to the former, not the latter. Id. at 
33-34. The prosecutor elaborated that those, like Defendant, convicted of 
distribution of significant amounts of drugs were never placed in the RSAT program 
because federal authorities would withdraw their funding in face of the risk that 
distributors would find a ready pool of vulnerable customers to deal to. Id. at 13-14. 
As to the absence of a record of Defendant's RSAT assessment, Ms. Holden 
explained that the assessment for the RSAT program was merely a checklist—an 
informal interview in which nothing was recorded — assessing the subject's position 
in his substance abuse cycle, the treatment received, and the criminal record. Id. at 9, 
27-28. Davis Behavioral Health had never opened a file on Defendant. Id. at 26. 
Accordingly, no record of Defendant's screening existed and there was no record to 
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subpoena. Id. at 27-28. While the trial court expressed some concerns about this 
process, it found that Ms. Holden's explanation "clarified]" why a written 
screening assessment had not been prepared in Defendant's case. Id. at 28. 
Following his interview with Defendant, the evaluating therapist, Dave Hoffman, 
determined that the RSAT program, which is not an intensive residential program, 
was not appropriate for Defendant, who needed a very intensive program because 
of his serious cognitive problems. Id. at 9-10. See also Progress/ Violation report, 
R230-32. The prosecutor and Ms. Holden pointed out that Defendant's screening 
was done at the special behest of the court, even though the prosecutor and Ms. 
Holden knew at the outset that Defendant's drug distribution record rendered him 
ineligible for the RSAT program. Id. at 8-9,12-15, 36-37. 
Near the end of the hearing, Ms. Holden made the following statement: 
I went through all Mr. Waterfield's records. He's been referred 
to 11 programs over the years. And we've put him through every 
halfway house and program and inpatient and outpatient that we 
could possibly do to try to help him. And then it kind of comes down 
to well, yeah. We want to use all these programs like you are saying, 
but what do you do when you get somebody that just won't 
participate. Or you give them these tools and they go right back to 
what they were doing and now you are asking for another program. 
We're going to give them the tools again. At some point you think you 
need to cut your losses and say, you know what, we've got to save 
these beds for people that really want treatment that are going to 
utilize them because we have to maximize, like you are saying, these 
opportunities for the few people that are really going to get it. And it's 
hard for us to know, but we do look at some of these charges really 
seriously because they help us to understand, are we dealing with 
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addicts or dealing with criminals that aren't going to get it. It's 
subjective in some ways, but I think are we try [sic] to use really good 
screening criteria to make sure we're as fair as we can be. 
And in Mr. Waterfield's case I already knew he wouldn't be able 
to go in the program because of the type of charges he had. But I 
thought, you know, I knew your intent from what I heard from the 
court, you really wanted him to get treatment. 
R469:36-37. 
The court stated that it was "comfortable with the situation," that it did not 
need to hear from Mr. Hoffman, the screening therapist, and that the participants at 
the hearing had "made a record adequate" to establish that further screening of 
Defendant for the RSAT program was unnecessary. Id. at 39-41. Defendant did not 
object to this finding. Id. at 41-43. 
2. Because Defendant has failed to adequately brief his prejudice 
claim the Court should decline to consider it 
Rule 30, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides that "[a]ny error, defect, 
irregularity or variance which does not affect the substantial rights of a party shall 
be disregarded." Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a). Therefore, in asking this Court to reverse 
the trial court's ruling on the legality of the sentence imposed on him on April 14, 
the burden is on Defendant to show that he was prejudiced. Defendant has not 
even begun to undertake that burden. 
The appellate court "is not a depository in which the appealing party may 
dump the burden of argument and research." West Jordan City v. Goodman, 2006 UT 
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27, *[} 29,135 P.3d 874, " An adequately briefed argument must provide meaningful 
legal analysis/' Id. An appellant must include "citations to the . . . parts of the 
record relied on" in making his argument. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). "It is well 
established that a reviewing court will not address arguments that are not 
adequately briefed." Spencer v. Pleasant View City, 2003 UT App 379, | 20, 80 P.3d 
546 (quoting State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299,305 (Utah 1998)). 
Defendant argues that the trial court's erroneous ruling—that the sentence 
imposed on April 14 was illegal —"precluded [him] from challenging the dubious 
RSAT program assessment" and from "having the court legitimately consider him 
for a residential drug treatment program such as the RSAT program." Aplt. Br. at 
16-17. In other words, Defendant claims that the court's ruling prejudiced him. 
Defendant's sole citation to the record in support of that claim, however, is that 
"[ajfter listening to the State's informal explanation of the RSAT Program 
assessment, the district court became 'comfortable' with the situation." Aplt. Br. at 
9. Nowhere does Defendant recite any of the following facts that directly 
undermine his claim: (1) Defendant did not object to that ruling; (2) the trial court 
nevertheless repeatedly expressed great concern that Defendant might not have 
received an adequate review for the RSAT program or due process in challenging 
the review procedure; and (3 ) as a result of the court's concern, the State was 
compelled to explain in detail (i) how the screening procedure —an informal 
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checklist procedure —worked, (ii) how eligibility for the RSAT program— 
distinguishing drug users from criminals with drug addiction—was applied to 
treatment candidates generally, (iii) why Defendant particularly-with drug 
distribution and other felony convictions — was automatically determined to be 
ineligible for the RSAT program, (iv) what special features in Defendant's 
psychological makeup — serious personality and cognitive problems — further 
disqualified him from the RSAT program, and (v) why —because no file had ever 
been opened —there were no records at Davis Behavioral Health for Defendant to 
subpoena. See Aple. Br. at I.B.I. Defendant also fails to mention the trial court's 
unusual support in insisting that Defendant receive an additional review by the 
screening therapist, notwithstanding that Defendant had breached the zero-
tolerance conditions of his probation and that the AP&P staff knew that Defendant's 
criminal record made him ineligible for the RSAT program. R469: 8-9,12-15,36-37. 
Defendant fails to mention that AP&P readily acceded to the court's request, 
thereby providing both him and the court a written evaluation of additional 
psychological reasons supporting the determination of ineligibility. Id.) 230-32. And 
finally, Defendant fails to mention Ms. Holden's very personal explanation that 
Defendant had failed to take advantage of innumerable treatment opportunities to 
the detriment of those who might dedicate themselves to their rehabilitation. 
R469:36. 
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Further, Defendant's simple assertion, that the trial court was "comfortable" 
with the record establishing that a new screening to evaluate Defendant's eligibility 
for the RSAT program was unnecessary, is patently inadequate in light of the 
inquiry that the trial court undertook and which Defendant fails to even mention. 
See Goodman, 2006 UT 27, Tf 29. 
In sum, because Defendant has failed to adequately brief his prejudice claim, 
the Court should decline to consider it. 
3. The record amply shows that the trial court considered the 
entire existing record of Defendant's prior exclusion from the 
RSAT program to determine that further screening for that 
program was unnecessary. 
The trial court expressed its view at both the September 8 and September 16 
hearings that AP&P's earlier decision that Defendant was ineligible for the RSAT 
program, was moot. R468:2-3, 5; 469:5. Defendant claims that this expression 
precluded review of the earlier determination or his being legitimately considered 
for the program at resentencing. Aplt. Br. at 16-17,16 n.12. 
The facts of the court's review of the matter, see Aple. Br. at I.B.I., refute that 
claim. Although the court's assertion of mootness might have appeared to foreclose 
the issue, the record shows that the court, in fact, considered Defendant's 
resentencing options only in terms of how AP&P had earlier screened him. 
Specifically, the court asked the parties to be prepared to answer its concerns about 
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why Defendant had been unable to receive written records from the earlier 
assessment. R468:3-9; 469:6-7,11,15-16. The court challenged the prosecution about 
whether Defendant's distribution drug charges were sufficient to disqualify him 
from the program. R469.13-14, 32-33. And it received extensive input about how 
AP&P had responded to the court's unusual request that Defendant receive an 
additional psychological review in spite of his being ineligible under the usual 
guidelines. Id at 8-9,12-15, 36-37. 
Given the court's demonstrated concern for Defendant's rights, if the court 
had not been "comf ortable" with the accounts it received it would almost certainly 
have concluded that Defendant should be accepted into the RSAT or some similar 
program. Moreover, defense counsel did not object to the court's suggestion of 
mootness, likely because the court made it evident that it would be considering its 
sentencing options based on how the prior screening process had been conducted. 
R468:3, 5, 8-9; 469:5-6. And despite the court's explicit notice at the September 8 
hearing, that it wanted to hear information about the prior screening, and counsel's 
stated intention to subpoena witnesses, see R468:6, 9, Defendant presented no 
evidence or argument to rebut the prosecution's presentation that he was treated 
fairly in the screening process. 
In short, although the court indicated that it believed the prior matter was 
moot, its discussion of Defendant's resentencing options shows that it was not. In 
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any case, the record shows that the trial court fully considered whether Defendant 
was an appropriate candidate for the RSAT program for purposes of resentencing. 
See Aple. Br. at I.B.I. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO RESOLVE ON THE RECORD 
TWO CLAIMED INACCURACIES IN THE PRESENTENCE 
REPORT; THEREFORE, THE CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED 
TO THE TRIAL COURT 
The State concedes that the trial court failed to resolve on the record two 
claimed inaccuracies in the PSI. Aplt. Br. at 16-18. 
When a defendant informs the court of an inaccuracy in his presentence 
investigation report, the trial court has a statutory duty to address and resolve the 
alleged inaccuracy on the record. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-1 (6)(a)(West 2009). 
The Utah Supreme Court has interpreted section 77-18-l(6)(a) to "'require[] the 
sentencing judge to consider the party's objections to the report, make findings on 
the record as to whether the information objected to is accurate, and determine on 
the record whether that information is relevant to the issue of sentencing.'" 
Maroney, 2004 UT App 206, | 26 (quoting State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, ^ 44, 973 P.2d 
404). 
Defendant claims that, in addition to other numerous objections to the PSI, he 
informed the court that the PSI included "incorrect drug treatment programs in 
which, according to AP&P, [he] had participated." Aplt. Br. at 18. Specifically, 
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Defendant told the trial court that, contrary to the PSI, he was not involved in a 1999 
Davis Behavioral Health Program and that he was not involved in a Drug Board at 
the prison. R469:20. The trial court did not respond, apparently because 
Defendant's assertions were embedded in a broader oral presentation. Id. at 19-21. 
Defendant, however, does not claim that the trial court's failure to address these 
matters prejudiced its sentencing decision. Nevertheless, because the trial court did 
not resolve these two claimed inaccuracies on the record, the case should be 
remanded to the trial court for resolution of these matters. 
Defendant further claims that his counsel was ineffective for not explicitly 
asking the trial court to correct additional claimed inaccuracies in the PSI. Aplt. Br. 
at 19-22. The Court should decline to consider this claim because it is inadequately 
briefed. 
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, defendant "must meet 
the heavy burden of showing that (1) trial counsel rendered deficient performance 
which fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment, and (2) 
counsel's deficient performance prejudiced him." State v. Charon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 
(Utah 1998) (citing State v. Argals, 921 P.2d 439,441 (Utah 1996) (citing Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984))). In meeting his burden, Defendant must 
overcome the presumption "that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance; that is, . . . the presumption that under the 
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circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy/' 
State v. Ferry, 2007 UT App 128, ^ 11,163 P.3d 647 (citing State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 
539, 542 (Utah App. 1998)). Moreover, "proof of ineffective assistance of counsel 
cannot be a speculative matter but must be a demonstrable reality/' Nicholls v. State, 
2009 UT 12,136,203 P.3d 976 (citing State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76,1j 8,12 P.3d 92). 
The demonstrable reality of the claim "must be born out by the record/7 Id. A 
reviewing court will consider an ineffective assistance claim only when the "record 
is adequate to permit decision of the issue." Id. (citing State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 
1027,1029 (Utah 1991)). 
Defendant has not adequately briefed his ineffective assistance claim. "A 
brief must go beyond providing conclusory statements and 'fully identify, analyze, 
and cite its legal arguments/" Goodman, 2006 UT 27, | 29 (citing State v. Green, 2005 
UT 9, f 11,108 P.3d 710). "It is well established that a reviewing court will not 
address arguments that are not adequately briefed." Spencer, 2003 UT App 379, f 20 
(quoting State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998)). 
Similarly, Defendant must support his claim "by all the relevant evidence of 
which defendant is aware." Litherland, 2000 UT 76, | 17. When a claim of 
ineffective assistance is raised on appeal and "the record appears inadequate in any 
fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies resulting therefrom simply will be construed in 
favor of a finding that counsel performed effectively." Id. 
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Here, Defendant has failed to meet his "heavy burden" of proving his trial 
counsel's ineffectiveness. Defendant fails to even identify any of the other claimed 
inaccuracies brought to the trial court's attention, nor does he provide any reasoned 
argument about how the court's failure to resolve them resulted, as he alleges, in a 
more severe sentence. Aplt. Br. at 21. Cf. State v. Wilbert, 2006 UT App 470, at p.2 
(unpublished memorandum decision) (rejecting ineffective assistance claim where 
brief on appeal failed to identify any factual inaccuracy in the presentence report). 
Accordingly, the court should decline to consider this claim.4 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted March/^ , 2010. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
fer 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
t Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
4
 The State acknowledges that trial counsel did allege five additional 
inaccuracies in the PSI, all of which the trial court resolved on the record, but 
without comment as to relevance to sentencing. R649:27-31. 
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-201 (West Supp. 2009) Definitions-Sentences or 
combination of sentences allowed—Civil penalties—Hearing 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Conviction" includes a: 
(i) judgment of guilt; and 
(ii) plea of guilty. 
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted or 
any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the 
sentencing court with or without an admission of committing the criminal 
conduct. 
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general damages, 
which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil action arising out of 
the facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the 
money equivalent of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and 
losses including earnings and medical expenses. 
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages 
to a victim, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or 
transportation and as further defined in Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims 
Restitution Act. 
(e)(i) "Victim" means any person who the court determines has suffered 
pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities. 
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's criminal 
activities. 
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a person convicted 
of an offense to any one of the following sentences or combination of them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; 
(e) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or 
(f) to death. 
(3)(a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law to: 
(i) forfeit property; 
(ii) dissolve a corporation; 
(iii) suspend or cancel a license; 
(iv) permit removal of a person from office; 
(v) cite for contempt; or 
(vi) impose any other civil penalty. 
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence. 
(4)(a) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary 
damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the 
defendant make restitution to the victims, or for conduct for which the defendant has 
agreed to make restitution as part of a plea agreement. 
(b) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria 
and procedures as provided in Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act. 
(5)(a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court shall order the 
defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses if the defendant 
was: 
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another within the state at 
governmental expense to resolve pending criminal charges; 
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and 
(iii) convicted of a crime. 
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental 
transportation expenses if any of the following apply: 
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent failure to appear a 
warrant is issued for an infraction; or 
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order. 
(c)(i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsection (5)(a)(i) 
shall be calculated according to the following schedule: 
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported; 
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported; and 
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported. 
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5)(c)(i) applies to each defendant 
transported regardless of the number of defendants actually transported in a single trip. 
(d) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, Chapter 30, 
Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is convicted of criminal activity in 
the county to which he has been returned, the court may, in addition to any other sentence 
it may impose, order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended by any 
governmental entity for the extradition. 
(6)(a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, and unless otherwise 
ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection (6)(c), the defendant shall pay restitution to 
the county for the cost of incarceration in the county correctional facility before and after 
sentencing if: 
(i) the defendant is convicted of criminal activity that results in incarceration in the 
county correctional facility; and 
(ii)(A) the defendant is not a state prisoner housed in a county correctional facility 
through a contract with the Department of Corrections; or 
(B) the reimbursement does not duplicate the reimbursement provided under 
Section 64-13e-104 if the defendant is a state probationary inmate, as defined in 
Section 64-13e-102, or a state parole inmate, as defined in Section 64-13e-102. 
(b)(i) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) are the amount determined by 
the county correctional facility, but may not exceed the daily inmate incarceration costs 
and medical and transportation costs for the county correctional facility. 
(ii) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) do not include expenses 
incurred by the county correctional facility in providing reasonable accommodation for 
an inmate qualifying as an individual with a disability as defined and covered by the 
federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 12101 through 12213, 
including medical and mental health treatment for the inmate's disability. 
(c) In determining whether to order that the restitution required under this Subsection 
(6) be reduced or that the defendant be exempted from the restitution, the court shall 
consider the criteria under Subsections 77-38a-302 (5)(c)(i) through (iv) and shall enter 
the reason for its order on the record. 
(d) If on appeal the defendant is found not guilty of the criminal activity under 
Subsection (6)(a)(i) and that finding is final as defined in Section 76-1-304, the county 
shall reimburse the defendant for restitution the defendant paid for costs of incarceration 
under Subsection (6)(a). 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-3-201; Laws 1979, c. 69, § 1; Laws 1981, c. 59, § 1; Laws 1983, 
c. 85, § 1; Laws 1983, c. 88, § 3; Laws 1984, c. 18, § 1; Laws 1986, c. 156, § l;Laws 
1987, c. 107, § 1; Laws 1990, c. 81, § 1; Laws 1992, c. 142, § 1; Laws 1993, c. 17, § 1; 
Laws 1994, c. 13, § 19; Laws 1995, c. 111, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, c. 117, § 1, 
eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, c. 301, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, c. 337, § 1, eff. 
May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, 1st Sp.Sess., c. 10, § 1, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 1996, c. 40, § 
1, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 1996, c. 79, § 98, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 1996, c 241, §§ 
2, 3, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 1998, c. 149, § 1, eff. May 4, 1998; Laws 1999, c. 270, § 
15, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 2001, c. 209, § 1, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2002, c. 35, § 4, 
eff. May 6, 2002; Laws 2003, c. 280, § 1, eff. May 5, 2003; Laws 2006, c. 208, § 1, eff. 
May 1, 2006; Laws 2007, c. 154, § 1, eff. April 30, 2007; Laws 2007, c. 339, § 3, eff. 
April 30, 2007; Laws 2007, c. 353, § 9, eff. April 30, 2007; Laws 2008, c. 151, § 1, eff. 
May 5, 2008. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-2a-l (West Supp. 2009) Pleas in Abeyance—Definitions 
For the purposes of this chapter: 
(1) "Plea in abeyance" means an order by a court, upon motion of the prosecution and the 
defendant, accepting a plea of guilty or of no contest from the defendant but not, at that 
time, entering judgment of conviction against him nor imposing sentence upon him on 
condition that he comply with specific conditions as set forth in a plea in abeyance 
agreement. 
(2) "Plea in abeyance agreement" means an agreement entered into between the 
prosecution and the defendant setting forth the specific terms and conditions upon which, 
following acceptance of the agreement by the court, a plea may be held in abeyance. 
Laws 1993, c. 82, §3. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-1 (West Supp. 2009) Suspension of sentence-Pleas held in 
abeyance-Probation —Supervision—Presentence investigation—Standards-
Confidentiality—Terms and conditions—Termination, revocation, modification, or 
extension—Hearings—Electronic monitoring 
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction with a plea in 
abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as provided in Title 77, 
Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the plea in abeyance agreement. 
(2)(a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction of any crime 
or offense, the court may, after imposing sentence, suspend the execution of the sentence 
and place the defendant on probation. The court may place the defendant: 
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections except in 
cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions; 
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a private 
organization; or 
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court. 
(b)(i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the department is 
with the department. 
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of the sentencing 
court is vested as ordered by the court. 
(iii) The court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers. 
(3)(a) The department shall establish supervision and presentence investigation standards 
for all individuals referred to the department. These standards shall be based on: 
(i) the type of offense; 
(ii) the demand for services; 
(iii) the availability of agency resources; 
(iv) the public safety; and 
(v) other criteria established by the department to determine what level of services 
shall be provided. 
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted to the Judicial 
Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an annual basis for review and comment 
prior to adoption by the department. 
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures to implement the 
supervision and investigation standards. 
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider modifications to 
the standards based upon criteria in Subsection (3)(a) and other criteria as they consider 
appropriate. 
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an impact report and 
submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations subcommittee. 
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department is not required to supervise 
the probation of persons convicted of class B or C misdemeanors or infractions or to 
conduct presentence investigation reports on class C misdemeanors or infractions. 
However, the department may supervise the probation of class B misdemeanants in 
accordance with department standards. 
(5)(a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the concurrence of the 
defendant, continue the date for the imposition of sentence for a reasonable period of 
time for the purpose of obtaining a presentence investigation report from the department 
or information from other sources about the defendant. 
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact statement 
according to guidelines set in Section 77-38a-203 describing the effect of the crime on 
the victim and the victim's family. 
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific statement of pecuniary 
damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the department regarding the payment 
of restitution with interest by the defendant in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a, 
Crime Victims Restitution Act. 
(d) The presentence investigation report shall include: 
(i) findings from any screening and any assessment of the offender conducted under 
Section 77-18-1,1; and 
(ii) recommendations for treatment of the offender. 
(e) The contents of the presentence investigation report are protected and are not 
available except by court order for purposes of sentencing as provided by rule of the 
Judicial Council or for use by the department. 
(6)(a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report to the 
defendant's attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel, the prosecutor, and 
the court for review, three working days prior to sentencing. Any alleged inaccuracies in 
the presentence investigation report, which have not been resolved by the parties and the 
department prior to sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the sentencing judge, 
and the judge may grant an additional ten working days to resolve the alleged 
inaccuracies of the report with the department. If after ten working days the inaccuracies 
cannot be resolved, the court shall make a determination of relevance and accuracy on the 
record. 
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence investigation report at 
the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered to be waived. 
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, or 
information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present concerning the 
appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information shall be presented in open 
court on record and in the presence of the defendant. 
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the court may require that the 
defendant: 
(a) perform any or all of the following: 
(i) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being placed on 
probation; 
(ii) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense Costs; 
(iii) provide for the support of others for whose support the defendant is legally 
liable; 
(iv) participate in available treatment programs, including any treatment program in 
which the defendant is currently participating, if the program is acceptable to the 
court; 
(v) serve a period of time, not to exceed one year, in a county jail designated by the 
department, after considering any recommendation by the court as to which jail the 
court finds most appropriate; 
(vi) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use of electronic 
monitoring; 
(vii) participate in compensatory service restitution programs, including the 
compensatory service program provided in Section 76-6-107.1; 
(viii) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment services; 
(ix) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with interest in 
accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act; and 
(x) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers appropriate; and 
(b) if convicted on or after May 5, 1997: 
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain a high school graduation diploma, a 
GED certificate, or a vocational certificate at the defendant's own expense if the 
defendant has not received the diploma, GED certificate, or vocational certificate 
prior to being placed on probation; or 
(ii) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items listed in 
Subsection (8)(b)(i) because of: 
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or 
(B) other justified cause. 
(9) The department shall collect and disburse the account receivable as defined by 
Section 76-3-201.1, with interest and any other costs assessed under Section 64-13-21 
during: 
(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance with Subsection 
77-27-6(4); and 
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised probation and 
any extension of that period by the department in accordance with Subsection (10). 
(10)(a)(i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the court or upon 
completion without violation of 36 months probation in felony or class A misdemeanor 
cases, or 12 months in cases of class B or C misdemeanors or infractions. 
(ii)(A) If, upon expiration or termination of the probation period under Subsection 
(10)(a)(i), there remains an unpaid balance upon the account receivable as defined 
in Section 76-3-201.1, the court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the 
defendant on bench probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the payment of 
the account receivable. 
(B) In accordance with Section 77-18-6, the court shall record in the registry of 
civil judgments any unpaid balance not already recorded and immediately 
transfer responsibility to collect the account to the Office of State Debt 
Collection. 
(iii) Upon motion of the Office of State Debt Collection, prosecutor, victim, or upon 
its own motion, the court may require the defendant to show cause why the 
defendant's failure to pay should not be treated as contempt of court. 
(b)(i) The department shall notify the sentencing court, the Office of State Debt 
Collection, and the prosecuting attorney in writing in advance in all cases when 
termination of supervised probation will occur by law. 
(ii) The notification shall include a probation progress report and complete report of 
details on outstanding accounts receivable. 
(1 l)(a)(i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after having been 
charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing to revoke probation does not 
constitute service of time toward the total probation term unless the probationer is 
exonerated at a hearing to revoke the probation. 
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision concerning 
revocation of probation does not constitute service of time toward the total 
probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at the hearing. 
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a violation report 
with the court alleging a violation of the terms and conditions of probation or upon the 
issuance of an order to show cause or warrant by the court. 
(12)(a)(i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver of a hearing by 
the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court that the probationer has violated 
the conditions of probation. 
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court and a finding that 
the conditions of probation have been violated. 
(b)(i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts asserted to 
constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the court that authorized probation 
shall determine if the affidavit establishes probable cause to believe that revocation, 
modification, or extension of probation is justified. 
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to be served on the 
defendant a warrant for the defendant's arrest or a copy of the affidavit and an order to 
show cause why the defendant's probation should not be revoked, modified, or extended. 
(c)(i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the hearing and shall 
be served upon the defendant at least five days prior to the hearing. 
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance. 
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right to be represented 
by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel appointed if the defendant is indigent. 
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present evidence. 
(d)(i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations of the affidavit. 
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the prosecuting attorney 
shall present evidence on the allegations. 
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the allegations are 
based shall be presented as witnesses subject to questioning by the defendant unless the 
court for good cause otherwise orders. 
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in the defendant's own 
behalf, and present evidence. 
(e)(i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact. 
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of probation, the court 
may order the probation revoked, modified, continued, or that the entire probation 
term commence anew. .. 
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the sentence 
previously imposed shall be executed. 
(13) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of the Division 
of Substance Abuse and Mental Health for treatment at the Utah State Hospital as a 
condition of probation or stay of sentence, only after the superintendent of the Utah State 
Hospital or the superintendent's designee has certified to the court that: 
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at the state hospital; 
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and 
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-15-610(2)(g) are receiving priority for 
treatment over the defendants described in this Subsection (13). 
(14) Presentence investigation reports are classified protected in accordance with Title 
63G, Chapter 2, Government Records Access and Management Act. Notwithstanding 
Sections 63G-2-403 and 63G-2-404, the State Records Committee may not order the 
disclosure of a presentence investigation report. Except for disclosure at the time of 
sentencing pursuant to this section, the department may disclose the presentence 
investigation only when: 
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63G-2-202(7); 
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by the department 
for purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of the offender; 
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole; 
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or the subject's 
authorized representative; or 
(e) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the presentence investigation 
report or the victim's authorized representative, provided that the disclosure to the 
victim shall include only information relating to statements or materials provided by the 
victim, to the circumstances of the crime including statements by the defendant, or to 
the impact of the crime on the victim or the victim's household. 
(15)(a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of probation under the 
supervision of the department, except as provided in Sections 76-3-406 and 76-5-406.5. 
(b) The department shall establish procedures and standards for home confinement, 
including electronic monitoring, for all individuals referred to the department in 
accordance with Subsection (16). 
(16)(a) If the court places the defendant on probation under this section, it may order the 
defendant to participate in home confinement through the use of electronic monitoring as 
described in this section until further order of the court. 
(b) The electronic monitoring shall alert the department and the appropriate law 
enforcement unit of the defendant's whereabouts. 
(c) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions which require: 
(i) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times; and 
(ii) that a device be placed in the home of the defendant, so that the defendant's 
compliance with the court's order may be monitored. 
(d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement through 
electronic monitoring as a condition of probation under this section, it shall: 
(i) place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the Department of 
Corrections; 
(ii) order the department to place an electronic monitoring device on the 
defendant and install electronic monitoring equipment in the residence of the 
defendant; and 
(iii) order the defendant to pay the costs associated with home confinement to the 
department or the program provider. 
(e) The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through electronic 
monitoring only for those persons who have been determined to be indigent by the 
court. 
(f) The department may provide the electronic monitoring described in this section 
either directly or by contract with a private provider. 
Laws 1980, c. 15, § 2; Laws 1981, c. 59, § 2; Laws 1982, c. 9, § 1; Laws 1983, c. 47, § 1; 
Laws 1983, c. 68, § 1; Laws 1983, c. 85, § 2; Laws 1984, c. 20, § 1; Laws 1985, c. 212, § 
17; Laws 1985, c. 229, § 1; Laws 1987, c. 114, § 1; Laws 1989, c. 226, § 1; Laws 1990, 
c. 134, § 2; Laws 1991, c. 66, § 5; Laws 1991, c. 206, § 6; Laws 1992, c. 14, § 3; Laws 
1993, c. 82, § 7; Laws 1993, c. 220, § 3; Laws 1994, c. 13, § 24; Laws 1994, c. 198, § 1; 
Laws 1994, c. 230, § 1; Laws 1995, c. 20, § 146, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, c. 117, § 
2, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, c. 184, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, c. 301, § 3, 
eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, c. 337, § 11, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, c. 352, § 6, eff. 
May 1, 1995; Laws 1996, c. 79, § 103, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 1997, c. 390, § 2, eff. 
May 5, 1997; Laws 1998, c. 94, § 10, eff. May 4, 1998; Laws 1999, c. 279, § 8, eff. May 
3, 1999; Laws 1999, c. 287, § 7, eff. May 3,1999; Laws 2001, c. 137, § 1, eff. April 30, 
2001; Laws 2002, c. 35, § 7, eff. May 6, 2002; Laws 2002, 5th Sp.Sess., c. 8, § 137, eff. 
Sept. 8, 2002; Laws 2003, c. 290, § 3, eff. May 5, 2003; Laws 2005, 1st Sp.Sess., c. 14, § 
3, eff. July 1, 2005; Laws 2007, c. 218, § 3, eff. July 1, 2007; Laws 2008, c. 3, § 252, eff. 
Feb. 7, 2008; Laws 2008, c. 382, § 2193, eff. May 5, 2008; Laws 2009, c. 81, § 3, eff. 
May 12, 2009. 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 22 Sentence, Judgment and commitment 
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall set a 
time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two nor more than 45 days after 
the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the concurrence of the defendant, otherwise 
orders. Pending sentence, the court may commit the defendant or may continue or alter 
bail or recognizance. 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make 
a statement and to present any information in mitigation of punishment, or to show any 
legal cause why sentence should not be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be 
given an opportunity to present any information material to the imposition of sentence. 
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's absence, defendant 
may likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence. If a defendant fails to appear for 
sentence, a warrant for defendant's arrest may be issued by the court. 
(c)(1) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall impose 
sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include the plea or the 
verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following imposition of sentence, the court shall advise 
the defendant of defendant's right to appeal and the time within which any appeal shall be 
filed. 
(c)(2) If the defendant is convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, as 
defined in Utah Code Section 77-36-1, the court shall advise the defendant orally or in 
writing that, as a result of the conviction, it is unlawful for the defendant to possess, 
receive or transport any firearm or ammunition. The failure to advise does not render the 
plea invalid or form the basis for withdrawal of the plea 
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its commitment setting 
forth the sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to the jail or prison shall deliver a 
true copy of the commitment to the jail or prison and shall make the officer's return on 
the commitment and file it with the court. 
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, 
at any time. 
(f) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the court shall impose sentence in 
accordance with Title 77, Chapter 16a, Utah Code. If the court retains jurisdiction over a 
mentally ill offender committed to the Department of Human Services as provided by 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(l)(b), the court shall so specify in the sentencing order. 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 30 Errors and Defects 
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the substantial rights 
of a party shall be disregarded. 
(b) Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors in the 
record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time and 
after such notice, if any, as the court may order. 
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2nd District - Farmingto: 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UT. P „ SECOND 
OlSiRfCTCOlJRT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
BRYAN WATERFIELD, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
POST SENTENCING 
JUDGMENT/COMMITMENT 
AP&P ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
Case No: 061700802 FS 
Judge: JON M. MEMMOTT 
Date: April 14, 2008 
PRESENT 
Clerk: kellyr 
Prosecutor: WESTMOR.ELAND, R.ICK T 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): HUNT, ELIZABETH 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: January 11, 1967 
Video 
Tape Number: 7-041408 Tape Count: 9:25/9:45 
CHARGES 
1. DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO DIST C/S - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 12/10/07 Guilty 
5. POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (amended) - 2nd Degree 
Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 12/10/07 Guilty 
HEARING 
Ms. Hunt addresses the Court. Mr. Westmoreland makes statements, 
Defendant makes statements. Hearing proceeds as follows: 
Minutes - Post Sentencing 
CD24266252 pages: 
061700802 WATERFIELD,BRYAN 
Page 1 
Case No: 061700802 
Date: Apr 14, 2008 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT and COMMITMENT 
The defendant admits the following numbered allegations as stated 
in the Affidavit and Order to Show Cause: 1, 2 and 3 
The defendant's probation is revoked. 
The defendant's probation is reinstated for 72 months beginning 
April 14, 2008. 
OTHER: All previous terms and conditions of probation will remain. 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Defendant is to serve 12 Months in the Davis County Jail. 
0-^ S— X_ W A l M . W A a . 1 W -X- K-? l— W J>- V — £ • W J_ V— ^ \-J V_ X X V— X-' W**- V _i_ t~/ V ^ W W i * ^ V «—' >-*«- -I L. J - W JL fc_^ W -L- V _ 4 . S w < w . 
Commitment is to begin immediately. 
To the Davis County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for confinement. 
POST SENTENCE JAIL NOTE 
Defendant is to be screened, enter into and complete the RSAT 
Program. 
Per court order, probation was revoked in Court but should have 
been revoked and reinstated. Court so orders that in this minute 
entry. 
Dated this Q \ day of Qufto") ^ , 20 5 ^ . 
r* /\ rx \f\/\ ^—\i 
JON M. MEMMOTT 
District Court Judge 
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SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNP 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRYAN WATERFIELD, 
Defendant. 
JAIL COMMITMENT 
Case No. 061700802 
TO: DAVIS COUNTY JAIL: 
Whereas, the above-named defendant on April 14, 2008, was sentenced by 
the Honorable Jon M. Memmott, District Judge, to serve a term of 12 months in the 
Davis County Jail. 
NOW THEREFORE, the above-named defendant is remanded into your custody 
to serve this sentence with the following conditions: Defendant is to be screened, 
enter into and successfully complete the RSAT Program. 
Dated this 14th day of April, 2008, with the Seal of the Court affixed hereto. 
•^K^ _ - f C r* *-- ' \ 
ALYSON BROWN 
Clerk of Court 
Kelly Roger^on / '*• '~> - f •'-*•- c r~'-
Deputy Clerk 
By, 
X- **v**s*.*> 
Charge: Probation Violations - F2 Distribute/Offer/Arrange to Dist C/S 
Probation Violations - F2 Possession of a Controlled Substance 
Jail Commitment 
